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Abstract
Chapter 1: Globalization, Regional Productivity, Taste Bias and Internal Spatial Distri-
bution
This essay looks at (i) globalization, (ii) regional heterogeneity in productivity, and (iii) taste
bias over domestic and foreign goods as key determinants of spatial agglomeration. It is shown
that pro-agglomeration effects come from foreign being more important relative to domestic coun-
try.
Chapter 2: Foreign Productivity Improvements and Domestic Welfare Effects
This essay looks at the impact of foreign productivity improvements on domestic welfare. First,
it shows that under flexible wages, a region’s productivity improvement benefits its trading partner.
Second, it is shown that a productivity improvement of a developing region benefits the entire
economy; it, however, creates losers as well as winners in its trading partner.
vi
Preface
The current thesis is a collection of two essays contributing on the field of New Economic Geog-
raphy and International Trade. The title of the first essay is "Globalization, Regional Productivity,
Taste Bias and Internal Spatial Distribution". The title of the second essay is "Foreign Productivity
Improvements and Domestic Welfare Effects". I believe that the current Ph.D. thesis illustrates and
sheds light on the role of some fundamental insights for the class of New Economic Geography
and International Trade models, in general.
vii
1 Globalization, Regional Productivity, Taste
Bias and Internal Spatial Distribution
Abstract
I consider an integrated model consisting of a system of two symmetric regions and the rest of the
world that features (i) globalization, (ii) regional heterogeneity in productivity and (iii) taste bias
over domestic and foreign goods as key determinants of spatial agglomeration. I show that falling
external trade barriers favor internal agglomeration. Moreover, a reduction in relative productivity
compensates for the trade barriers between the two symmetric regions and the rest of the world;
this also favors internal agglomeration of the mobile factor. In addition, I consider two cases of
taste bias namely ethnocentrism and xenocentrism. I find that a shift of consumer preferences in
the two symmetric regions with respect to goods that are made in the rest of the world results in
internal agglomeration, too. Finally, a shift of consumer preferences in a region with respect to
goods that are made in the other region results (i) in internal agglomeration under ethnocentrism,
and (ii) in internal dispersion under xenocentrism.
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1.1 Introduction
New Economic Geography has provided various explanations for the agglomeration or dispersion
of economic activities over a geographical space.1 The present paper contributes to the litera-
ture by studying an integrated model that features (i) globalization, (ii) regional heterogeneity in
productivity and (iii) taste bias over domestic and foreign goods as key determinants of spatial
agglomeration. These three factors have been reported, both empirically and theoretically, to in-
fluence the spatial distribution of economic activities and hence I believe that it is imperative to
study their interactions in a model that combines them all.
Concerning globalization, several indicators illustrate that economies are becoming more inte-
grated over the years. For instance, the value of trade as a percentage of the world GDP rose from
42% in 1980 to 60% in 2013 (Source: World Bank) and FDI increased from 6.5% of the world
GDP in 1980 to 31% in 2006 (Source: IMF). The increased level of integration is mainly due to
institutional changes within countries and various trade agreements among countries which led to
the abandonment of many trade barriers. Globalization has indeed affected the spatial concentra-
tion of economic activities within countries or regions in various ways and hence this relationship
has become a major research issue for trade economists. Monfort and Nicolini (2000) study the
impact of international economic integration on the agglomeration process with the use of a model
with two symmetric countries, each consisting of two regions. They show that a reduction in in-
terregional and/or international trade costs favors regional agglomeration of economic activities.
In the same line of research, Monfort and van Ypersele (2003) study how a country’s spatial dis-
tribution affects the agglomeration forces in its partner country. In contrast to the work of Monfort
and Nicolini (2000), they assume that interregional transaction costs are not identical in the two
countries. They exhibit that both integration and agglomeration in one country make agglomer-
ation in the partner country less likely. Krugman and Livas-Elizondo (1996) show that openness
to international trade leads to internal dispersion of economic activities when rent and commuting
costs are present. Brülhart et al. (2004) study the impact of improved external market access on
the internal geography of a trading bloc consisting of two symmetric regions. Without provid-
ing analytical expressions for market’s centrifugal and centripetal forces, their work suggests that
improved external market access results in internal agglomeration of the mobile factor.
The assumption that regions are heterogeneous with respect to their productivity is of high im-
portance as many parts of the world, that recently became more integrated, have a higher produc-
tivity growth rate than the rest of the world. For instance, over the last twenty years, the Chinese
average annual productivity growth rate was approximately 8.9% whereas that of the EU and the
US was around 1.5%. During the same period of time, India achieved an average productivity
growth rate of 5.4% per year. This is greater than that of South Korea (approximately 3.9%),
which is, according to the data of World Bank, the country with the highest productivity growth
rate among developed countries.
Moreover, due to the process of integration and the development of technology, there exist
1 The interested reader should consult Fujita and Krugman (2004) for an introduction to the topic.
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transmissions of ideas and values around the world. As a result, worldwide consumer preferences
are updated and some groups of consumers develop a xenocentristic attitude as they put a higher
value on foreign made products, styles or ideas rather than those of their own country (Johnson,
2000). At the same time, other consumers develop an ethnocentristic attitude as they believe
that buying foreign products is unpatriotic and can harm the domestic economy (Balabanis et al.
(2002); Klein (2002)). Ethnocentrism still exists in the EU although its people tend to be less
ethnocentric than those in developing and emerging countries (Lindquist et al. (2001); Sharma
et al. (1995)).
In the present work, I extend the framework of Brülhart et al. (2004) counting for technological
differences and biased preferences in order to further explore the impact of globalization on the
internal distribution of a trading bloc’s economic activity. More specifically, I consider a model
with two countries, labeled Foreign country and Domestic country, which is a union of two regions.
In this setup, technological differences concern the regional heterogeneity in labor productivity and
biased preferences deal with the idiosyncrasies in the consumer taste.
The results in this paper complement very well several existing ones. First of all, my results
confirm those of Brülhart et al. (2004) by showing that falling external transportation costs favor
internal agglomeration. They also clarify conceptually and analytically why this must be the case.
A decrease in relative productivity has an identical impact as the one that comes from falling
external trade barriers. Intuitively, a reduction in relative productivity compensates the effect that
comes from the trade barriers between Domestic country and Foreign country, and this favors
internal agglomeration of the mobile factor. It should be noted that these results are derived under
the quasi-linearity assumption, which means that the income effect has been eliminated. In order to
study the robustness of the model, I relax this assumption (Section 1.2.5) by considering a Cobb-
Douglas utility function. My findings exhibit that the model is fully robust, as falling external
trade barriers result again in internal agglomeration of the economic activity.
Furthermore, I compare the distribution of the mobile factor between the market equilibrium
allocation and the socially optimal allocation. My results show that the market level of internal
agglomeration is higher than the socially preferred level for some values of the internal freeness
of trade. For high and low values of the internal freeness of trade, both solutions coincide with
respect to the distribution of the mobile factor. This result is in line with the literature, as Ottaviano
and Thisse (2001), Tabuschi and Thisse (2002), Charlot et al. (2006), Pflüger and Südekum (2008)
also conclude that the market equilibrium outcome differs from the social optimum with respect
to the distribution of the mobile factor. My welfare analysis also enhances the existing literature
in a key aspect. I calculate the threshold value of the internal freeness of trade that determines
the efficiency of the market equilibrium outcome and I show how this value is affected by trade
policies and technological interventions.
Finally, concerning the effects of taste bias, I show that a shift of consumer preferences in
Domestic country with respect to goods that are made in Foreign country results in internal ag-
glomeration because this behavior compensates for the trade barriers between Domestic country
3
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and Foreign country. In Domestic country, a shift of consumer preferences in a region with respect
to goods that are made in its partner region results (i) in internal agglomeration in the case of eth-
nocentrism, and (ii) in internal dispersion in the case of xenocentrism. The model also shows that
in the case of ethnocentrism, internal agglomeration is favored for intermediate and high values of
the internal freeness of trade, whereas in the case of xenocentrism, internal agglomeration takes
place only for intermediate values of the internal freeness of trade.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 presents the model and char-
acterizes the location patterns of the market equilibrium under regional heterogeneity in labor
productivity. It also studies the robustness of the results. Section 1.3 derives the socially opti-
mal spatial pattern. Section 1.4 introduces taste bias across consumers and specifies the location
patterns of the market equilibrium under consumer taste bias. Finally, Section 1.5 concludes and
summarizes the main findings of the model.
1.2 The Model
1.2.1 Set up
Based on Brülhart et al. (2004) the economy consists of two countries named Domestic and For-
eign. Domestic country is a union of two regions labeled North and South, respectively. In each
country there exist two types of household supplying unskilled and skilled labor. Both of them
inelastically supply one-factor unit each. In Domestic country unskilled labor is immobile and
equally distributed across regions. The total mass of unskilled labor in each region is ρ. Skilled
labor is interregionally mobile. I normalize the total mass of skilled labor to one. A proportion λ
of skilled households is located in North and the rest (1−λ) is located in South. In Foreign country
there exist ρ immobile unskilled households and n immobile skilled households. Each household
derives utility from an aggregate of manufacturing varieties and an agricultural good.
In each country there exist two production sectors called agricultural and manufacturing sector,
respectively. The agricultural sector produces a homogeneous good in a perfectly competitive
environment under constant returns with unskilled labor as input. There is no transport cost for
the agricultural goods; the agricultural sector is sufficiently large to guarantee positive output; the
agricultural good also serves as the numeraire.
In addition, there exists a Dixit-Stiglitz manufacturing sector that produces a large variety of
differentiated products. Each variety is produced using both unskilled and skilled labor. Unskilled
labor is the variable input and skilled labor enters as fixed cost. Manufacturing goods are tradable
with iceberg trade costs. The cost mark-up factor is denoted by τu > 1 for trade between the
regions of Domestic country and by τ f > τu for trade of each region of Domestic country with
Foreign country. Trade of manufacturing varieties within each region and within Foreign country
is free.
Both countries are symmetric in terms of technology in the agricultural sector. However, the
labor productivity differs across countries in the manufacturing sector with the one in Domestic
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country being higher than that in Foreign country. Without loss of generality, I normalize the labor
productivity in Domestic country to be equal to one. In Foreign country the labor productivity is
0 < δ < 1. The production of a manufacturing variety in Domestic country requires one unit of
unskilled labor as marginal cost and one unit of skilled labor as fixed cost. In Foreign country, a
manufacturing variety is produced using 1/δ units of unskilled labor as marginal cost and one unit
of skilled labor as fixed cost.
1.2.2 Preferences and Demand
Household preferences are characterized by a quasi-linear utility function with CES sub-utility
over manufacturing varieties. In this kind of models, the quasi-linearity assumption is proposed
by Pflüger (2004) and also used in other works such as Pflüger and Südekum (2008). The quasi-
linear preferences make the calculations simpler although do not take into account the income
effect. Let the utility of a typical household located in region i be
Ui = α lnCiX +C
i
A (1.1)
with,
CiX =
(∫
V
li(v)
σ−1
σ dv
) σ
σ−1
, i = n, s, f , (1.2)
where 0 < α < 1 and α < κ = min{Rn,Rs,R f }; σ > 1 and V = Vn ∪ Vs ∪ V f .
CiX is the consumption of the manufacturing aggregate and C
i
A denotes the consumption of the
agricultural good. Per capita consumption of a household located in region i is denoted by li. Vn,
Vs and V f are the numbers of varieties that are produced in North, South and Foreign country,
respectively. σ expresses the elasticity of substitution between any two manufacturing varieties.
α is the expenditure on manufacturing products. Rn, Rs and R f are the wages of skilled labor
paid in North, South and Foreign country, respectively. The budget constraint of a representative
household is given by
PiCiX +C
i
A = Yi, i = n, s, f . (1.3)
Yi denotes the household’s income located in region i. Pn is the perfect CES-price index for the
manufacturing aggregate in North,
Pn =
∫
Vn
pn(v)1−σdv +
∫
Vs
(τups(v))1−σdv +
∫
V f
(τ f p f (v))1−σdv
 11−σ , (1.4)
and Ps is the perfect CES-price index in South,
Ps =
∫
Vs
ps(v)1−σdv +
∫
Vn
(τupn(v))1−σdv +
∫
V f
(τ f p f (v))1−σdv
 11−σ . (1.5)
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Similarly, the CES-price index for Foreign country is
P f =
∫
Vn
(τ f pn(v))1−σdv +
∫
Vs
(τ f ps(v))1−σdv +
∫
V f
p f (v)1−σdv
 11−σ (1.6)
with τ f > τu > 1.
pn, ps, and p f denote the producer prices for a variety that is produced in North, South and Foreign
country, respectively. Iceberg trade costs are formalized by the parameters τu and τ f . Iceberg trade
cost implies that only 1τ of a unit of a variety shipped arrives at its destination. It also implies that
the consumer price of an imported variety is pτ, where p is the price of this variety at its region of
origin.
Each household maximizes its utility subject to its budget constraint. It derives the demand
functions for the manufacturing aggregate and the agricultural good as
CiX =
α
Pi
, CiA = Yi − α, i = n, s, f . (1.7)
Moreover, the demand functions of a representative household located in North for manufacturing
varieties are obtained as
xnn = αp−σn Pσ−1n , xns = α(τups)−σPσ−1n , xn f = α(τ f p f )−σPσ−1n . (1.8)
xnn denotes the demand of a representative household located in North for varieties that are pro-
duced in North; xns is the demand of the same household for varieties that are produced in South;
xn f denotes the demand for varieties that are imported from Foreign country. Similarly, demand
functions
xsn = α(τupn)−σPσ−1s , xss = αp−σs Pσ−1s , xs f = α(τ f p f )−σPσ−1s (1.9)
are obtained for a typical household located in South. xsn denotes the demand of a household
located in South for varieties that are produced in North; xss is the demand for varieties that are
produced in South; xs f denotes the demand of the same household for varieties that are produced
in Foreign country. Finally, the demand functions of a representative household located in Foreign
country are
x f n = α(τ f pn)−σPσ−1f , x f s = α(τ f ps)
−σPσ−1f , x f f = αp
−σ
f P
σ−1
f . (1.10)
x f n is the demand of a typical household located in Foreign country for varieties that are produced
in North; x f s denotes the demand of the same household for varieties that are produced in South;
x f f is the demand for varieties that are produced in Foreign country.
The indirect utility is given by
Ii = Yi − α ln Pi, i = n, s, f . (1.11)
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1.2.3 Production and Short-run Market Equilibrium
The agricultural good is produced in a perfectly competitive environment under constant returns
with a unit input requirement of unskilled labor. Perfect competition enforces marginal cost pric-
ing. Costless trade equalizes prices within Domestic country, and also between Domestic and
Foreign country. This indirectly makes the wage rates of unskilled labor equal to one in both
countries since the agricultural good serves as the numeraire.
Turning to the industrial sector, each manufacturing variety is supplied by a single firm. The
market clearing condition for a variety requires that the total production is equal to the total de-
mand for this variety. Thus, the market clearing condition for a variety that is produced in North
is
Xn = (ρ + λ)xnn + (ρ + 1 − λ)τuxsn + (ρ + n)τ f x f n. (1.12)
A part of the demand is caused by transport losses. Similarly, the market clearing condition for a
variety that is produced in South is
Xs = (ρ + λ)τuxns + (ρ + 1 − λ)xss + (ρ + n)τ f x f s. (1.13)
Also, the market clearing condition for a variety that is produced in Foreign country is
X f = (ρ + λ)τ f xn f + (ρ + 1 − λ)τ f xs f + (ρ + n)x f f . (1.14)
I assume that all firms within a region have access to the same technology. Moreover, the labor
productivity in Domestic country is higher than that in Foreign country. Thus, the profits of a
representative firm located either in North or in South are
pii = (pi − 1)Xi − Ri, i = n, s. (1.15)
Similarly, the profits of a representative firm located in Foreign country are
pi f = (p f − 1
δ
)X f − R f . (1.16)
Imposing the Chamberlinian large group assumption, each producer perceives an elasticity of
demand equal to σ. Thus, profit-maximizing prices are constant mark-ups over marginal costs.
Then,
pn = ps =
σ
σ − 1 = p¯, p f =
(
σ
σ − 1
) 1
δ
= p¯
1
δ
. (1.17)
In order to simplify the notation, I define ξ = δσ−1. As a result, the CES-price indices for the
manufacturing goods in the three regions can be derived as
Pn = p¯
(
λ + (1 − λ)φu + nφ f ξ
) 1
1−σ , Ps = p¯
(
λφu + (1 − λ) + nφ f ξ
) 1
1−σ , (1.18)
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and
P f = p¯
(
φ f + nξ
) 1
1−σ . (1.19)
where φ f < φu ≡ τ1−σu ≤ 1 and φ f ≡ τ1−σf are parameters which are inversely related to trade
costs. The two parameters capture the freeness of trade within the union and between the regions
of the union and Foreign country.
Moreover, the wage rate of skilled workers is adjusted in order to ensure zero profits. Therefore,
the zero profit condition implies that
Xi = (σ − 1)Ri, i = n, s, (1.20)
and
X f = δ(σ − 1)R f . (1.21)
Finally, imposing the condition of zero profits along with the aggregate demand functions (1.12),
(1.13), (1.14) and the price indices and optimal firm prices, the equilibrium skilled wages in every
region (i.e. Rn, Rs and R f ) are obtained as
Rn =
α
σ
[
ρ + λ
λ + (1 − λ)φu + nφ f ξ +
φu(ρ + (1 − λ))
λφu + (1 − λ) + nφ f ξ +
φ f (ρ + n)
φ f + nξ
]
(1.22)
and
Rs =
α
σ
[
φu(ρ + λ)
λ + (1 − λ)φu + nφ f ξ +
ρ + (1 − λ)
λφu + (1 − λ) + nφ f ξ +
φ f (ρ + n)
φ f + nξ
]
(1.23)
and
R f =
αξ
σ
[
φ f (ρ + λ)
λ + (1 − λ)φu + nφ f ξ +
φ f (ρ + (1 − λ))
λφu + (1 − λ) + nφ f ξ +
ρ + n
φ f + nξ
]
. (1.24)
The short-run equilibrium wages depend on the productivity parameter, the allocation of skilled
and unskilled households, the internal and external freeness of trade and the elasticity of substitu-
tion between varieties.
1.2.4 Market Equilibrium in the Long-run
In the long-run skilled workers are allowed to move across regions within the union in response to
differences in indirect utilities. This adjustment process over time t is governed by the differential
equation
dλ
dt
≡ λ˙ = (Vn − Vs)λ(1 − λ). (1.25)
The differential utility for skilled workers is
Vn − Vs = (Rn − Rs) − α ln
(
Pn
Ps
)
. (1.26)
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It can be expressed in an analytical form for general trade costs as
Vn − Vs = α
σ
[
(ρ + λ)(1 − φu)
(λ + (1 − λ)φu + nφ f ξ) −
(ρ + 1 − λ)(1 − φu)
((1 − λ) + λφu + nφ f ξ)
]
− α ln
(
(λ + (1 − λ)φu + nφ f ξ)
((1 − λ) + λφu + nφ f ξ)
) 1
1−σ
=
=
α(1 − φu)
σ
(
Mn
Qn
− Ms
Qs
)
− α
1 − σ ln
(
Qn
Qs
)
,
(1.27)
with market sizes
Mn = ρ + λ, Ms = ρ + 1 − λ, (1.28)
and potentials
Qn = λ + (1 − λ)φu + nφ f ξ, Qs = (1 − λ) + λφu + nφ f ξ. (1.29)
In equation (1.27), the external freeness of trade (φ f ), the productivity parameter (ξ) and the
number of skilled workers located in Foreign country (n) can be merged into a new parameter
C = nξφ f . In this case, equation (1.27) is algebraically identical to that in a framework without
considering regional heterogeneity in labor productivity such as in Brülhart et al. (2004). The
interesting part is the economic interpretation of the relative productivity as well as the analytical
specification of all agglomeration and dispersion forces in the market.
A symmetric allocation of the mobile factor, i.e. λ = 12 , is always a long-run equilibrium in this
model. It can be easily seen that λ = 12 always leads to a long-run equilibrium since Vn − Vs = 0.
However, due to the agglomeration forces, this equilibrium is not necessarily stable. In order to
evaluate the stability of the symmetric allocation, I evaluate the sign of the derivative
∆V ′ =
[
d(Vn − Vs)
dλ
]
λ=1/2
= S L + DL −CE. (1.30)
The outcome of the derivative in (1.30) can be split into three different market forces: the supply
and the demand linkage (agglomeration forces), and the competition effect (dispersion force). One
of the main contributions of the current work is the analytical specification and determination of
the agglomeration and dispersion forces in the market. The supply linkage (SL) says that the
region with the higher share of skilled workers has a large manufacturing sector. As a result, the
price index of the manufacturing aggregate is lower in that region. I obtain the SL evaluating the
derivative of the logarithmic ratio of price indices between South and North with respect to the size
of skilled workers in North at the symmetric allocation. Let M¯ = Mn |λ=1/2= Ms |λ=1/2= ρ + 1/2
and Q¯ = Qn |λ=1/2= Qs |λ=1/2= 1/2(1 + φu) +C. Then,
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S L =
[
d [α ln (Ps/Pn)]
dλ
]
λ=1/2
=
=
2α(1 − φu)
(σ − 1)Q¯ =
4α(1 − φu)
(σ − 1)((1 + φu) + 2C) .
(1.31)
The demand linkage (DL) says that an increase in the share of skilled workers located in North
implies a large local market. Therefore, the relative profitability in this market increases. This
implies that the wage differential between North and South (i.e. Rn − Rs) rises. I obtain the
demand linkage evaluating the derivative of the wage differential with respect to λ at the symmetric
allocation keeping the market potentials constant, in order to isolate the market size effect. Thus,
DL =
[
d (Rn(Mn,Ms,Qn,Qs) − Rs(Mn,Ms,Qn,Qs))
dλ
]
λ=1/2;(Qn,Qs f ixed)
=
=
2α(1 − φu)
σQ¯
=
4α(1 − φu)
σ((1 + φu) + 2C)
.
(1.32)
Finally, the competition effect (CE) comes from the fact that a movement of firms from South
to North increases competition on products that are produced in North for given expenditures. I
obtain the competition effect evaluating the derivative of the wage differential with respect to λ at
the symmetric allocation, keeping the market sizes constant. Thus,
CE =
[
d (Rn(Mn,Ms,Qn,Qs) − Rs(Mn,Ms,Qn,Qs))
dλ
]
λ=1/2;(Mn,Ms f ixed)
=
=
2α(1 − φu)2M¯
σQ¯2
=
4α(1 + 2ρ)(1 − φu)2
σ((1 + φu) + 2C)2
.
(1.33)
The symmetric allocation constitutes a stable long-run equilibrium when (1.30) is negative. I
consider the absolute value of all agglomeration and dispersion forces although they have different
impacts on the stability of the long-run equilibrium. More specifically, both supply and demand
linkages force the symmetric allocation to become an unstable long-run equilibrium while the
competition effect is the stabilizing effect, being responsible for the stability of the symmetric
allocation in the model.
Falling external trade barriers increase the market potentials (i.e. Q¯ goes up); this has a nega-
tive impact on all market forces, according to equations (1.31), (1.32) and (1.33). Moreover, as ξ
goes up Foreign market becomes more productive. All agglomeration and dispersion forces de-
cline in absolute terms. A decrease in relative productivity has an identical impact on the market
forces as the one that comes from falling external trade barriers. Since an increase in the com-
posed parameter C has a negative impact on all market forces, it is interesting to study which
effect dominates and why. In order to simplify the analysis, I consider the following monotonic
transformations of the three market forces. Let ˜S L = S L f , D˜L = DL f and C˜E = CE f , with
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f = σQ¯/
[
2α(1 − φu)] > 0. Then, the agglomeration effect (AE) is given as
AE = ˜S L + D˜L =
2σ − 1
σ − 1 , (1.34)
and the dispersion effect (DE) is given as
DE = C˜E =
(1 − φu)(1 + 2ρ)
1 + φu + 2C
. (1.35)
Obviously, the agglomeration effect (AE) depends on σ, and the dispersion effect (DE) depends
on all other parameters of interest. The AE is strictly decreasing in σ (i.e. dAEdσ < 0). The DE is
strictly decreasing in φu and C; it also increases in ρ. Thus, an increase in φu and/or C results in
internal agglomeration since it reduces the DE without affecting the AE. Additionally, an increase
in σ and/or ρ favors internal dispersion since the former reduces the AE, and the latter increases
the DE. Finally, the dependence of C on σ is neglected since an increase in σ reduces C. This
adds another dispersing effect, enhancing the initial effect of σ.
In order to study where the symmetric allocation constitutes a long-run stable equilibrium, I
evaluate the sign of expression (1.30). Figure 1.1 illustrates the magnitude of all agglomeration and
dispersion forces for different values of the internal and external freeness of trade. I am interested
in specifying the two critical levels of the internal freeness of trade for which the derivative in
(1.30) becomes zero. At those two break points, the agglomeration forces (i.e. SL and DL) are
canceled out by the dispersion force (i.e. CE).
Figure 1.1: Magnitude of Agglomeration and Dispersion Forces
For values between these two break points, expression (1.30) is positive. This implies that the
agglomeration forces dominate the dispersion force. As a result, the economic activity within
the union is concentrated in one region. Between the autarky point and the first break point,
the dispersion force dominates the agglomeration forces. Therefore, (1.30) is negative and thus
11
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dispersion of skilled workers takes place within the union.
It can be seen graphically that these two critical levels of the internal freeness of trade are
obtained by the intersection of the blue curve with the level where expression (1.30) is equal to
zero. After obtaining those two break points, I study how they depend on the rest of the parameters
mainly focusing on the external freeness of trade and the relative productivity. The first break point
is trivial since it is constant and equal to one. The second break point is the interesting one since
it depends on the parameters of interest. The analytical expressions are
φtr = 1, (1.36)
and
φcr =
(2ρ − 4C − 1)σ + 2(C − ρ)
(3 + 2ρ)σ − 2(1 + ρ) . (1.37)
It can be seen that the numerator of φcr is always lower than its denominator since σ > 1.
This implies that φcr is always smaller than one. Let N and D denote the numerator and de-
nominator of φcr, respectively. Obviously, the denominator is positive. In addition, D − N =
3σ − 2 + 4Cσ + σ − 2C > 0 ⇔ 4σ > 2 which holds since σ > 1. Thus, the numerator is smaller
than the denominator, possibly even negative. In order to avoid the "black hole" case where φcr is
negative and only concentration takes place, the numerator must be positive too.
Lemma 1.1: NBH ("no black hole") holds if and only if the two conditions (α): 2ρ > 1 + 4C
and (β): σ > 2(ρ−C)2ρ−4C−1 hold simultaneously.
Proof. If σ > 2(ρ−C)2ρ−4C−1 and 2ρ > 1 + 4C, then N > 0. Now, let the NBH condition hold. Then,
σ(2ρ − 4C − 1) > 2(ρ −C) (1.38)
Let ρ < C, then 2ρ − 4C − 1 < 2ρ − 2C < 0. Thus, (1.38) is violated. Thus, ρ ≥ C, and hence
2ρ − 4C − 1 > 0. But then (1.38) implies β. 
The first condition implies that the "black hole" case is avoided when the composite parameter
C does not take high values. This can happen in two cases. First, in the case where the trade
between the regions of the union and Foreign country is not completely free; second, when the
relative productivity is not very small (i.e. the union is significantly more productive than Foreign
country). The second condition implies that the elasticity of substitution between varieties should
be above a particular threshold. This means that individuals should not have very high preferences
for diversity. The following proposition summarizes how a change in the composed C, the propor-
tion of unskilled workers ρ, and the elasticity of substitution affects the critical break point φcr.
Proposition 1.1: The critical break point φcr
1. decreases in the composed parameter C,
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2. increases in the proportion of unskilled workers ρ and the elasticity of substitution σ.
Proof.
i.
dφcr
dC
=
2 − 4σ
σ(3 + 2ρ) − 2(1 + ρ) < 0. (1.39)
The numerator is negative and the denominator is positive. Thus, the sign of the derivative
is negative.
ii.
dφcr
dρ
=
2(σ − 1)(D − N)
D2
> 0. (1.40)
Expression (1.40) is positive since D > N.
Now, let r = 2ρ − 4C − 1 > 0. Then dφcrdσ > 0 iff:[
r − 2C′(σ)(2σ − 1)] [σ(2ρ + 3) − 2(ρ + 1)] > (2ρ + 3)r(σ − σ), (1.41)
with σ = 2(ρ−C)r > 1.
The productivity of the union is greater than that of Foreign country by assumption (i.e.
0 < δ < 1). This implies C′(σ) < 0. Then,
[
r − 2C′(σ)(2σ − 1)] [σ(2ρ + 3) − 2(ρ + 1)] > r [σ(2ρ + 3) − 2(ρ + 1)] . (1.42)
Now,
r
[
σ(2ρ + 3) − 2(ρ + 1)] > (2ρ + 3)r(σ − σ), (1.43)
which holds. Thus, (1.42) and (1.43) implies (1.41) and hence dφcrdσ > 0.

Falling external trade barriers reduce all market forces and, according to proposition 1.1, de-
crease the critical break point, too. This implies that the dispersion force (i.e. CE) falls faster than
the agglomeration forces (i.e. SL and DL). Thus, skilled workers are concentrated in one region
within the union. The impact that comes from a decrease in relative productivity is identical to
the one that comes from falling external trade barriers. More specifically, a reduction in relative
productivity favors internal agglomeration of the mobile factor. The same impact evolves when
the size of skilled workers located in Foreign country goes up. Intuitively, a decrease in rela-
tive productivity compensates for the trade barriers between the regions of the union and Foreign
country.
Finally, an increase in the elasticity of substitution between varieties implies low preferences
for diversity. This leads to weaker economies of scale at the firm level ( 1σ ). As a result, less
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agglomeration of skilled workers within the union takes place. Equations (1.31), (1.32) and (1.33)
show that the number of unskilled immobile workers affects only the competition effect. Thus, an
increase of unskilled immobile workers raises the CE in absolute terms. This leads to dispersion
of skilled labor within the union.
1.2.5 Robustness
1.2.5.1 Short-run Market Equilibrium
The quasi-linearity assumption is used for computational reasons. In fact, this choice does not
take into account the income effect. In this section, I study the importance of the income effect by
considering a Cobb-Douglas utility function. Let the preferences of a typical household located in
region i be
Ui = CiX
α
CiA
1−α
, i = n, s, f . (1.44)
Each household maximizes its utility subject to its budget constraint (1.3). It derives the new
demand functions for the manufacturing aggregate and the agricultural good as
CiX =
αYi
Pi
, CiA = (1 − α)Yi, i = n, s, f . (1.45)
The indirect utility is given by
ωi = β
Yi
Pαi
, β = αα(1 − α)1−α, i = n, s, f . (1.46)
Moreover, the new demand functions of a representative household located in North for manufac-
turing varieties are obtained as
x′nn = αp−σn Pσ−1n Yn, x′ns = α(τups)−σPσ−1n Yn, x′n f = α(τ f p f )
−σPσ−1n Yn. (1.47)
Similarly, demand functions
x′sn = α(τupn)−σPσ−1s Ys, x′ss = αp−σs Pσ−1s Ys, x′s f = α(τ f p f )
−σPσ−1s Ys (1.48)
are obtained for a typical household located in South. Finally, the new demand functions of a
representative household located in Foreign country are
x′f n = α(τ f pn)
−σPσ−1f Y f , x
′
f s = α(τ f ps)
−σPσ−1f Y f , x
′
f f = αp
−σ
f P
σ−1
f Y f . (1.49)
Combining the new aggregate demand functions together with the price indices and optimal firm
prices (See Section 1.2.3), the new short-run equilibrium skilled wages in every region (i.e. R′n,
R′s and R′f ) are obtained after solving the following system of equations for R
′
n, R
′
s and R
′
f , respec-
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tively.
R′n =
α
σ
 ρ + λR′nλ + (1 − λ)φu + nφ f ξ + φu(ρ + (1 − λ)R
′
s)
λφu + (1 − λ) + nφ f ξ +
φ f (ρ + nR′f )
φ f + nξ
 (1.50)
and
R′s =
α
σ
 φu(ρ + λR′n)λ + (1 − λ)φu + nφ f ξ + ρ + (1 − λ)R
′
s
λφu + (1 − λ) + nφ f ξ +
φ f (ρ + nR′f )
φ f + nξ
 (1.51)
and
R′f =
αξ
σ
 φ f (ρ + λR′n)λ + (1 − λ)φu + nφ f ξ + φ f (ρ + (1 − λ)R
′
s)
λφu + (1 − λ) + nφ f ξ +
ρ + nR′f
φ f + nξ
 . (1.52)
1.2.5.2 Long-run Market Equilibrium
In the long-run skilled workers are allowed to move within the union in response to their utility
differences. Instead of considering the utility differential, it is more convenient to consider the
ratio of the indirect utilities. Thus,
ωn
ωs
=
Rn
Rs
(
Ps
Pn
)α
. (1.53)
The symmetric allocation remains a long-run equilibrium in this model since it can be shown that
ωn
ωs
= 1 at λ = 12 . However, the symmetry can be either a stable or an unstable equilibrium. In
order to study the stability of the symmetric equilibrium, I evaluate the sign of the derivative
∆ω′ =
d
(
ωn
ωs
)
dλ

λ=1/2
=
d
(
Rn
Rs
)
dλ

λ=1/2
+
d
(
Ps
Pn
)α
dλ

λ=1/2
. (1.54)
In the current version of the model, the market potentials are identical to those given by equation
(1.29). However, the new market sizes depend on the skilled nominal wage rates. They are defined
as
M′n = ρ + λR′n, M′s = ρ + (1 − λ)R′s, M′f = ρ + nR′f , (1.55)
for North, South and Foreign country, respectively. In equation (1.54), the first term on the right
hand side denotes the demand linkage and the competition effect together. The second term is
the supply linkage. It is the same as the one given by equation (1.31). In the current model, the
demand linkage is slightly different. It is given by
DL =
4α(1 − φu)
(σ − α) + (σ + α)φu + 2nφ f ξ . (1.56)
In addition, the absolute value of the competition effect is given by
CE = DL
σ(1 − φu)(2nξ(σ − α) + (α + 2σ)φ f )
α(2nξ(σ − α)(1 + φu) + 3σ(1 + φu)φ f + 2nξ(2α + σ)φ2f )
. (1.57)
The next proposition summarizes how the market forces change as the external freeness of trade
improves.
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Proposition 1.2: All market forces decrease in the external freeness of trade φ f .
Proof. From (1.31), it follows that dS Ldφ f < 0. Similarly, from (1.56) it is obvious that
dDL
dφ f
< 0.
Let, A = 2nξ(σ−α), B = (α+ 2σ), Γ = 2nξ(σ−α)(1 + φu), ∆ = 3σ(1 + φu) and E = 2nξ(2α+σ).
Then, I consider the first derivative of the following monotonic transformation with respect to φ f
as
d
(
αCE
σ(1−φu)
)
dφ f
=
dDL
dφ f
A + Bφ f
Γ + ∆φ f + Eφ2f
+ DL
−BEφ2f − 2AEφ f + BΓ − A∆
(Γ + ∆φ f + Eφ2f )
2
< 0, (1.58)
since BΓ − A∆ < 0 and dDLdφ f < 0. 
Proposition 1.2 shows that an improvement in the external freeness of trade reduces all market
forces. The reduction of both SL and DL tends to make the symmetry a stable long-run equilib-
rium while the reduction of CE forces the symmetry to become an unstable long-run equilibrium.
Due to the complexity of the equations that describe the market forces, I cannot show which force
dominates. When the agglomeration forces dominate the dispersion force, the symmetric alloca-
tion is not a stable long-run equilibrium. On the contrary, when the dispersion force dominates
the agglomeration forces, the symmetry constitutes a stable long-run equilibrium. I study this case
numerically considering different values for the basic parameters of the model (i.e. α, σ, n, ξ).
The selection of the parameter values is based on the work of Head and Mayer (2004). More
specifically, when the industrial sector stands for all tradable goods in the economy, estimations
of σ vary between 3 and 5, whereas α takes values between 0.5 and 0.8. By contrast, when this
sector is a specific industry, σ sharply rises because varieties are now much better substitutes than
in the aggregate level. A value of σ close to 7 is then acceptable. In that case, α typically takes
a value lower than 0.2, which approximately corresponds to the share of the manufactured good
in a developed economy. The productivity parameter ξ takes values between 0 and 1. Also, n is
arbitrarily chosen between 1 and 5.
I consider the effect of reducing the external trade barriers on the spatial distribution of the
union’s economic activity. For given values of the parameters α, σ, n, ξ, I set (1.54) equal to
zero and solve it numerically for the values of the critical break point over a range of values of
φ f ∈ [0, 1]. The results are obtained for a specific parameter profile. In particular, I consider that
σ ∈ {4, 7}, α ∈ {0.2, 0.6}, ξ ∈ {0.3, 0.5, 0.9} and n ∈ {1, 3, 5}. After taking into account all 36
possible combinations of the parameter profile, I find that the results in Section 1.2.4 are robust, as
falling external trade barriers lead to internal agglomeration of the economic activity. For example,
Figure 1.2 shows how the critical break point changes with respect to the external freeness of trade
for σ = 4, α = 0.6, n = 1 and ξ = 1/2.
After considering the income effect, I show that the critical break point falls as long as the
external freeness of trade increases. This result implies that in the Cobb-Douglas case, falling
external trade barriers lead to internal agglomeration of the economic activity. This result is in
accordance with the prediction of the model under the quasi-linearity assumption.
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Figure 1.2: φcr and External Freeness of Trade
1.3 Welfare
In this section, I conduct a welfare analysis considering a Utilitarian concept where a social planner
is assumed to maximize the un-weighted sum of individual indirect utilities. I use a Utilitarian
approach due to the fact that under the assumption of quasi-linear preferences, the marginal utility
of income for all agents in the economy is equal to one. This implies that income redistributions
do not affect the aggregate welfare.
Let Iun , I
u
s and I
u
f denote the indirect utility of an unskilled immobile worker in North, South and
Foreign country, respectively. Similarly, I sn and I
s
s denote the indirect utility of a skilled mobile
worker located in North and South. I sf is the indirect utility of a skilled immobile worker located
in Foreign country. Therefore, I define the Utilitarian social welfare function as
Ω(λ) = λI sn + (1 − λ)I ss + nI sf + ρ(Iun + Ius + Iuf ). (1.59)
There are two sources of inefficiency in the model. The first comes from the fact that the
manufacturing sector is a monopolistic Dixit-Stiglitz sector. As a result, firms have market power
and their mill prices are not equal to their marginal costs. A constant mark-up is added, which
depends on the elasticity of substitution between varieties. The second source comes from the
decision of a skilled worker whether to migrate or not, without considering the effects of his
decision on market prices. As a result, a change in market prices influences the welfare of all other
agents in the economy.
In order to compute the optimal social allocation, I replace the analytical expressions for I sn, I
s
s ,
I sf , I
u
n , I
u
s and I
u
f into the social welfare function (1.59) above. Then, it can be shown that the first
derivative of the social welfare function with respect to the share of skilled workers in North (i.e.
dΩ
dλ ) is equal to zero at λ =
1
2 . Note that λ =
1
2 can be either a welfare maximum or a minimum.
Furthermore, it is possible that the social welfare function can have more extrema for different
values of λ.
Following the work of Pflüger and Südekum (2008), it is enough to calculate the second deriva-
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tive of Ω with respect to λ and evaluate it at λ = 12 . This is going to show us when the social planner
chooses either the symmetric allocation
(
λ = 12
)
or the (full or partial) agglomeration. Thus,
Ω′′ =
[
d2Ω
dλ2
]
λ= 12
=
4α(1 − φu)((1 − 2ρ + (3 + 2ρ)φu) + 4C)
(σ − 1)((1 + φu) + 2C)2 . (1.60)
The symmetric allocation constitutes a global maximum when Ω′′ < 0. The (full or partial)
agglomeration, however, is chosen when Ω′′ > 0. Setting expression (1.60) equal to zero and
solving for φu, two critical values are obtained as
φsctr = 1, (1.61)
and
φsccr =
2ρ − 4C − 1
3 + 2ρ
. (1.62)
I call the bifurcation point φsccr social break point, which occurs at the level of the internal free-
ness of trade, at which the symmetry λ = 12 is no longer the social optimum outcome. From
lemma 1.1 it holds that 2ρ > 1 + 4C. This implies that the social break point is greater than zero.
It can also be shown that the denominator of φsccr is larger than its numerator. Hence, φ
sc
cr is always
smaller than one. The next proposition summarizes how the market equilibrium outcome deviates
from the social optimal outcome.
Proposition 1.3: The market critical break point is lower than the social break point i.e.
φcr<φ
sc
cr .
Proof. It follows from subtracting the social break point from the market critical break point as
given by (1.62) and (1.37). Thus,
φcr − φsccr = −
2(1 +C)(1 + 2ρ)
(3 + 2ρ)((3 + 2ρ)σ − 2(ρ + 1)) < 0, (1.63)
because (3 + 2ρ)((3 + 2ρ)σ − 2(ρ + 1)) > 0 since σ > 1. 
The fact that the social break point is lower than the market critical break point means that less
agglomeration of skilled workers within the union is socially preferred. For φu ∈ (φcr, φsccr) the
market equilibrium outcome favors internal agglomeration although internal dispersion is socially
preferred. For φu < φcr and φu > φsccr the equilibrium outcome coincides with the social optimal
outcome. Both market and social forces are illustrated in Figure 1.3. The red curve depicts the
social outcome forces and the blue curve represents all market equilibrium forces. Dispersion of
skilled workers within the union is socially preferred between the autarky point and the social
break point. Between φsccr and φ
sc
tr expression (1.60) is positive. This implies that agglomeration of
the economic activity within the union is socially preferred.
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Figure 1.3: Market and Social Outcome Forces
Regarding the change of the social break point with respect to the remaining parameters C, ρ
and σ, the results are qualitatively the same as those in proposition 1.1. More specifically, it can be
shown that dφ
sc
cr
dC = − 4D < 0, dφ
sc
cr
dρ = − 2(D−N)D2 > 0 and
dφsccr
dσ = φCCσ > 0. Therefore, the comparative
static analysis for the point φsccr is qualitatively the same as the one for the point φcr and the basic
intuitions still hold. The mobility of skilled workers within the union affects (i) the skilled wage
rates in the entire economy, and (ii) the price indices in the union. The price index in Foreign
country, however, is not affected. As a result, with constant wages and unchanged price index, the
indirect utility of unskilled workers located in Foreign country is not affected by any relocation of
skilled workers within the union.
1.4 Consumer Taste Bias
As a matter of fact, there are broader cultural, traditional and political dimensions of globaliza-
tion. In this section, I study the multidimensional bias of household taste that mainly comes from
the different culture, religious, political and traditional aspects across regions. Due to these dif-
ferences, in some cases, individuals have the tendency to put more value on products that are
produced in their home region. In other cases, individuals put more value on goods, services and
other cultural elements which come from another region. In order to take these idiosyncratic dif-
ferences in consumer taste into account, I rewrite the CES utility in (1.2) for a typical household
located in North as
CnX =
∫
Vn
(Ahln(v))
σ−1
σ dv +
∫
Vs
(Apln(v))
σ−1
σ dv +
∫
V f
(A f ln(v))
σ−1
σ dv
 σσ−1 , (1.64)
where Ai is a utility shifter ("attractiveness") and can be interpreted as a monadic quality shifter.
In particular, Ah is the "attractiveness" of all products that are produced in the home region, Ap
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denotes the "attractiveness" of all products that are produced in the other region of the union called
partner region, and A f is the quality shifter of the products that are produced in the other country.
Similarly, the CES utility of a typical household located in South is
CsX =
∫
Vn
(Apls(v))
σ−1
σ dv +
∫
Vs
(Ahls(v))
σ−1
σ dv +
∫
V f
(A f ls(v))
σ−1
σ dv
 σσ−1 . (1.65)
Finally, for a typical household located in Foreign country the CES utility is
C fX =
∫
Vn∪Vs
(A f l f (v))
σ−1
σ dv +
∫
V f
(Ahl f (v))
σ−1
σ dv
 σσ−1 . (1.66)
In the light of isomorphism, the wage differential in (1.27) can be rewritten for the new values
φ˜u =
ψp
ψh
φu and φ˜ f =
ψ f
ψh
φ f with ψh = Aσ−1h , ψp = A
σ−1
p and ψ f = A
σ−1
f . The symmetric allocation
of skilled mobile workers (λ = 12 ) is a long-run equilibrium in this model. I study the stability of
the symmetric allocation following the same procedure as in Section 1.2.4. The new break points
are obtained as
φcr1 =
1
Ψp
, (1.67)
and
φcr2 =
(2ρ − 4Γ − 1)σ + 2(Γ − ρ)
Ψp((3 + 2ρ)σ − 2(1 + ρ)) , (1.68)
where Ψp =
ψp
ψh
and Γ = nΨ fφ f , with Ψ f =
ψ f
ψh
.
The first break point φcr1 is positive. Based on lemma 1.1, a modified NBH holds if and only if
(α): 2ρ > 1+4Γ and (β): σ > 2(ρ−Γ)2ρ−4Γ−1 hold simultaneously. Thus, under these two conditions, φcr2
is also greater than zero. Let φ˜cr be the critical break point in a model with neither taste bias nor
productivity differences. Then, in the light of isomorphism, φcr2 =
ψh
ψp
φ˜cr. Therefore, it is enough
φ˜cr <
ψp
ψh
= Ψp for φcr2 being less than one.
The ratio Ψ f =
ψ f
ψh
shows the relative taste bias between the home region and Foreign country.
Similarly, the ratio Ψp =
ψp
ψh
denotes the taste bias between the two regions of the union. The
comparative static analysis for the critical break point φcr2 is qualitatively the same as the one
for φcr, in proposition 1.1. Therefore, it can be shown that
dφcr2
dΓ < 0,
dφcr2
dρ > 0 and
dφcr2
dσ > 0.
Moreover, both φcr1 and φcr2 are strictly decreasing in the composed parameter Ψp (i.e.
dφcr1
dΨp
< 0
and dφcr2dΨp < 0). The impact of Ψ f on the critical break point φcr2 is identical to the impact of
φ f on φcr2, all else equal; Ψ f does not affect φcr1. I consider two cases of taste bias, namely
ethnocentrism and xenocentrism. Ethnocentrism underscores the belief that buying foreign made
products is unpatriotic. It can harm the domestic economy and this implies that Ah > Ap > A f .
On the contrary, xenocentrism is the preference for foreign made products, styles or ideas. This
implies that Ah < Ap and Ah < A f .
The critical break point φcr2 belongs to the relevant interval of φu. In the case of ethnocentrism,
Ψp < 1. This implies that φcr1 is greater than one. The symmetric allocation is stable between the
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autarky point and the critical point φcr2. In the interval between the two break points, the symmetry
is no longer stable. Thus, the mobile factor agglomerates within the union. Figure 1.4(a) shows
the magnitude of all agglomeration and dispersion forces in the case of ethnocentrism. Intuitively,
an increase in Ψ f compensates for the trade barriers between the home region and Foreign country.
This shifts the critical break point φcr2 to the left. Therefore, a shift of consumer preferences in the
union with respect to goods that are produced in Foreign country results in internal agglomeration
of the economic activity. Similarly, an increase in Ψp shifts φcr2 to the left. This also results in
internal agglomeration.
An interesting result comes from the case of xenocentrism since Ψp > 1. Thus, the critical
break point φcr1 is lower than one. The symmetry constitutes still an unstable long-run equilib-
rium in the interval between the two break points. It, however, becomes stable (i) between the
autarky point and φcr2, and (ii) between φcr1 and the completely free trade point. To see this, let
∆V ′∗ be the counterpart of equation (1.30) in a model with taste bias. Then, it can be shown that[ d∆V′∗
dφu
]
φu=φcr1
=
2αΨp(1−2σ)
(Γ+1)(σ−1)σ < 0 since σ > 1. This is a stability proof implying that, for φu > φcr1,
the symmetric allocation constitutes a stable long-run equilibrium in this model. Figure 1.4(b)
shows the magnitude of all agglomeration and dispersion forces in the case of xenocentrism. Dis-
persion of the mobile factor takes place within the union for small and high values of the internal
freeness of trade. For intermediate values of φu the symmetry is unstable. Thus, agglomeration
of the economic activity occurs within the union. Finally, an increase in Ψp shifts both φcr1 and
φcr2 to the left. It can be shown that
dφcr2
dΨp
>
dφcr1
dΨp
. This implies that φcr1 declines more than φcr2.
Therefore, an increase in Ψp results in internal dispersion of the mobile factor.
Figure 1.4: Market Equilibrium Outcome: Ethnocentrism Vs Xenocentrism
1.5 Conclusion
The results of the current paper contribute to the existing literature showing that pro-agglomeration
effects come from Foreign country being more important relative to Domestic country. I show that
falling external trade barriers favor internal agglomeration. I clarify conceptually and analytically
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why this must be the case. Moreover, I find that the impact that comes from a decrease in rel-
ative productivity is identical to the one that comes from falling external trade barriers. More
specifically, a reduction in relative productivity favors internal agglomeration of the mobile factor.
Falling internal trade barriers also result in internal agglomeration; the same impact comes when
the size of skilled workers located in Foreign country goes up. In addition, the model shows that
a shift of consumer preferences in Domestic country with respect to goods that are made in For-
eign country compensates for the trade barriers between Domestic country and Foreign country.
This also results in internal agglomeration of the mobile factor. In Domestic country, a shift of
consumer preferences in a region with respect to goods that are made in its partner region results
(i) in internal agglomeration in the case of ethnocentrism, and (ii) in internal dispersion in the
case of xenocentrism. Also, an increase either in σ or/and ρ leads to internal dispersion of skilled
workers within Domestic country. Finally, the welfare analysis suggests that, for some values of
the internal freeness of trade, the market level of internal agglomeration is higher than the socially
preferred level. For high and low values of the internal freeness of trade, both the market equilib-
rium allocation and the socially optimal allocation coincide with respect to the distribution of the
mobile factor. This result complements the one that comes from a model consisting of two sym-
metric regions, which also shows that less agglomeration of the mobile factor is socially preferred
for some values of the freeness of trade.
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2 Foreign Productivity Improvements and
Domestic Welfare Effects
Abstract
With the use of two models, I study whether a country’s productivity improvement is harmful or
beneficial for its trading partner. First, I apply a two-region, two-factor, one-sector general equi-
librium model that takes into account how factor prices respond to changes in relative productivity.
The consideration of factor price responses offers further insights into the impacts of productivity
improvements on welfare. I show that a region’s productivity improvement is beneficial for the
region itself as well as for its trading partner. Second, I use a two-region, two-sector monopolis-
tic competition model with regional differences in labor productivity, and two production factors
named skilled and unskilled labor. I show that a productivity improvement in a developing re-
gion (i) is beneficial for the entire economy, (ii) benefits all unskilled workers in the economy and
skilled workers in the developing region, and (iii) hurts skilled workers in the developing region’s
trading partner.
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2.1 Introduction
The current paper studies whether a country’s productivity improvement can be beneficial or harm-
ful for its trading partners. A part of the world, that recently became more integrated, has a higher
productivity growth rate than the rest of the world. For example, between 1995 and 2015, the
Chinese average annual productivity growth rate was approximately 8.9% far greater than that
of the US and the EU which was around 1.5% per year. During the same period of time, India
achieved an average annual productivity growth rate of 5.4%. This is greater than that of South
Korea (approximately 3.9%), which is, according to the data of World Bank, the country with the
highest productivity growth rate among developed countries.
Foreign productivity improvements have indeed affected domestic economy in various ways
and hence this relationship has become a major research issue for trade economists. The standard
models of international trade, such as Ricardian and Heckscher-Ohlin, show that the growth’s
nature determines the direction of the terms of trade effects. More specifically, an export-biased
growth tends to worsen a growing country’s terms of trade and benefits the rest of the world; an
import-biased growth, however, improves a growing country’s terms of trade and hurts the rest of
the world. In this manner, a country’s productivity change affects its trading partner’s welfare.
For instance, Dornbusch et al. (1977) develop a static Ricardian model with a continuum of
goods and show that a country’s uniform technological progress, caused by a uniform proportional
reduction in unit labor requirements, increases its trading partner’s welfare. It is also beneficial for
the growing country itself. However, Samuelson (2004) shows that a technological improvement
in developing and emerging countries can be harmful for advanced countries. The conclusion
of his analysis is that a growth in the rest of the world can hurt a country if it takes place in
sectors that compete with the country’s exports. Moreover, a technological progress may harm
the growing country itself. This possibility is referred in the literature as immiserizing growth and
was first introduced by Bhagwati (1958a,b) and generalized by Bhagwati (1968). Bhagwati shows
that an economic expansion increases a country’s output, but it might lead to a deterioration in the
country’s terms of trade and this can offset all the beneficial effects of the economic growth.
Monopolistic competition models with increasing returns to scale and heterogeneous firms pro-
vide additional adjustment channels, offering further insights into the impacts of trade and pro-
ductivity (See Krugman (1980); Helpman and Krugman (1985); Melitz (2003)). In these models,
a country’s productivity improvement increases market size, which results (i) in the reduction of
price indices for manufacturing products, and (ii) in a larger variety of products offered. Through
this channel, a country’s productivity improvement raises welfare in a trading partner. For reasons
unrelated to adverse terms of trade effects, Deminova (2008) shows that a country’s productivity
improvement decreases its trading partner’s welfare. She considers a monopolistic competition
model with heterogeneous firms and technological asymmetries. She shows that an average do-
mestic productivity improvement results in more entrants in domestic market while it discourages
foreign entries in the industry. Through this channel, domestic welfare goes up and foreign welfare
falls.
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The effects of foreign productivity improvements on domestic welfare constitute a central re-
search issue in several empirical studies, too. Using a multi-country, multi-industry general equi-
librium model of international trade, Hsieh and Ossa (2016) find that an increase in China’s pro-
ductivity growth during 1995-2007 raises the worldwide welfare by approximately 3%. However,
the effects on individual regions’ welfare in their sample range between −1.2% and 3.6%. Using
a Ricardian-Heckscher-Ohlin model, di Giovanni et al. (2014) show that the improvement of Chi-
nese productivity has different significant effects on the welfare across regions. In particular, for a
large number of Asian countries, the welfare effects are positive while some Latin American coun-
tries exhibit negative welfare effects. Both studies conclude that the rise of China’s productivity
affects different regions in different ways.
In the present work, I study how a country’s productivity improvement can affect its trading part-
ner’s welfare. I contribute to the existing literature in two key aspects. First, I apply a two-region,
two-factor, one-sector general equilibrium model with flexible wages, abandoning Deminova’s
uniform wage assumption. The uniform wage assumption switches off a channel that shows how
factor prices respond to changes in relative productivity. Therefore, the consideration of flexible
wages is of high importance as it offers further insights into the impacts of productivity improve-
ments on welfare. I show that a country’s productivity improvement is beneficial for the country
itself as well as for its trading partner. Second, I use a two-region, two-factor, two-sector mo-
nopolistic competition model, relaxing the single-factor (labor) assumption which is used in other
works (See Deminova (2008); Hsieh and Ossa (2016)). Under the single-factor assumption, for-
eign productivity changes do not have any impact on domestic income distribution. In reality,
however, any productivity change between countries creates losers as well as winners within each
country. Hence, I believe that it is imperative to study how benefits or losses that come from for-
eign productivity changes are distributed between domestic production factors. More specifically,
I consider a model consisting of two regions that are asymmetric in terms of labor productivity,
with the one being a developed and the other being a developing region. There are two sectors
and two production factors named skilled and unskilled labor. Skilled labor is a specific factor
since it is employed in manufacturing sector. Unskilled labor is a non-specific factor, being freely
mobile across sectors. I show that a productivity improvement in the developing region (i) benefits
the entire economy, (ii) benefits all unskilled workers in the economy and skilled workers in the
developing region, and (iii) hurts skilled workers in the developed region.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 presents the one-sector, two-
factor model. It characterizes the market equilibrium and contains the welfare analysis. Section
2.3 introduces the two-sector, two-factor model. It determines the analytical expressions for the
market equilibrium. It also contains the welfare analysis and studies the robustness of the model.
Finally, Section 2.4 concludes and summarizes the main findings of the paper.
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2.2 One-Sector, Two-Factor Model
2.2.1 Set up
I consider a model where the global economy consists of two regions, labeled North and South. In
each region there exist two types of household supplying unskilled and skilled labor, respectively.
Both of them inelastically supply one-factor unit each. Each household derives utility from an
aggregate of manufacturing varieties. I normalize the total mass of each skilled and unskilled
labor to one in the entire economy. A proportion θ of skilled households is located in North and
the rest (1 − θ) is located in South. Moreover, a proportion  of unskilled households is located in
North and the rest (1 − ) is located in South.
In each region, there exists a Dixit-Stiglitz industry. It produces a large variety of differentiated
products using both skilled and unskilled labor. Each variety is produced using unskilled labor
as variable input and skilled labor as fixed cost. Manufacturing goods are tradable with iceberg
costs. The cost mark-up factor is denoted by τ > 1 for trade between North and South. Trade of
manufacturing varieties within each region is free.
Finally, I assume that the labor productivity differs across regions with the one in North being
higher than that in South. Without loss of generality, I normalize the productivity of both skilled
and unskilled labor in North to be equal to one. In South, unskilled labor has productivity 0 < δ ≤ 1
and skilled labor has productivity 0 < α ≤ 1. The production of a manufacturing variety in North
requires one unit of unskilled labor as marginal cost and one unit of skilled labor as fixed cost. In
South a manufacturing variety is produced using 1/δ units of unskilled labor as marginal cost and
1/α units of skilled labor as fixed cost, respectively.
2.2.2 Demand Side
Household preferences are defined over a continuum of differentiated varieties. Consumers in
both regions derive utility from consuming a manufacturing aggregate. Let the utility of a typical
household located in region i be
Ci =
(∫
V
li(v)
σ−1
σ dv
) σ
σ−1
, i = n, s, (2.1)
with σ > 1 and V = Vn ∪ Vs.
Per capita consumption of a consumer located in region i is denoted by li. Vn and Vs are the num-
bers of varieties that are produced in North and South, respectively. The parameter σ expresses
the elasticity of substitution between any two manufacturing varieties. The budget constraint of a
representative household is given by
PiCi = yi, i = n, s, (2.2)
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where yi denotes the household’s income located in region i. Pn is the perfect CES-price index for
the manufacturing aggregate in North,
Pn =
[∫
Vn
pn(v)1−σdv +
∫
Vs
(τps(v))1−σdv
] 1
1−σ
. (2.3)
Similarly, Ps is the perfect CES-price index for the manufacturing aggregate in South,
Ps =
[∫
Vs
ps(v)1−σdv +
∫
Vn
(τpn(v))1−σdv
] 1
1−σ
. (2.4)
pn denotes the producer price for a variety that is produced in North and ps is the producer price
for a variety that is produced in South. The iceberg trade cost implies that only 1τ of a unit of a
variety shipped arrives at its destination. It also implies that the consumer price of an imported
variety from South to North is τps. Similarly, the consumer price of an imported variety from
North to South is τpn.
Maximizing the utility subject to the budget constraint (2.2), the demand functions of a typical
household located in North are obtained as
xnn = p−σn Pσ−1n yn, xns = (τps)−σPσ−1n yn. (2.5)
xnn denotes the demand of a representative household located in North for varieties that are pro-
duced in North; xns is the demand of the same household for varieties that are produced in South.
Similarly, demand functions
xsn = (τpn)−σPσ−1s ys, xss = p−σs Pσ−1s ys, (2.6)
are obtained for a typical household located in South. xsn denotes the demand of a representative
household located in South for varieties that are produced in North; xss is the demand of the same
household for varieties that are produced in South.
The indirect utility is given by
Ii =
yi
Pi
, i = n, s. (2.7)
2.2.3 Supply Side
Firms are monopolistically competitive and employ both skilled and unskilled labor under increas-
ing returns to scale. Product differentiation ensures that one firm produces a single variety. The
productivity level differs between North and South, where North is more efficient. I assume that
all firms within a region have access to the same technology. Thus, the profits of a North-based
representative firm are given by
pin = (pn − wn)Xn − Rn, (2.8)
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where wn denotes the unskilled wage rate and Rn is the skilled wage rate paid in North. Xn is the
total demand for a variety that is produced by a North-based firm.
Similarly, the profits of a South-based representative firm are given by
pis = (ps − 1
δ
ws)Xs − 1
α
Rs. (2.9)
ws denotes the unskilled wage rate and Rs is the skilled wage rate paid in South. Xs is the total
demand for a variety that is produced by a South-based firm. In South a productivity improvement
of unskilled labor reduces the marginal cost. This leads to a reduction of the mill consumer
price in South. Moreover, a productivity improvement of skilled labor increases the number of
manufacturing varieties that are produced in South. This can be seen by the skilled labor market
clearing condition which implies that in equilibrium the number of firms in each market is given
by
nn = θ, ns = (1 − θ)α. (2.10)
nn and ns are the numbers of manufacturing firms in North and South, respectively.
Following the standard approach, the profit-maximizing consumer price is a constant mark-up
of marginal cost. Thus,
pn =
σ
σ − 1wn = p¯wn, ps =
σ
σ − 1δ
−1ws = p¯δ−1ws. (2.11)
Furthermore, due to the fact that the elasticity of substitution between varieties is constant, the
income of skilled labor is a proportion of the total revenue. In the case of North the total income
is
Yn = p¯wn. (2.12)
Similarly, the total income in South is given as
Ys = p¯(1 − )ws. (2.13)
Equations (2.12) and (2.13) express the value of total supply in North and South, respectively.
2.2.4 Equilibrium
In South a productivity improvement of skilled labor decreases the CES-price indices; the same
impact comes from a productivity improvement of unskilled labor. Therefore, both productivity
parameters can be merged into one parameter. In order to further simplify the notation, I define
ξ = αδσ−1. As a result, the CES-price indices for manufacturing varieties in both regions can be
derived as
Pn = p¯
(
θw1−σn + (1 − θ)ξφw1−σs
) 1
1−σ , Ps = p¯
(
θφw1−σn + (1 − θ)ξw1−σs
) 1
1−σ , (2.14)
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where φ ≡ τ1−σ ≤ 1 is a parameter which is inversely related to trade costs. It captures the freeness
of trade between North and South. The equilibrium equations for both markets are obtained by
setting demand equal to supply in each region. Both total demand and supply in each region are
expressed in value terms. Thus, for North
Yn = θ
( pnPn
)1−σ
Yn +
(
pn
Ps
)1−σ
φYs
 . (2.15)
Similarly for South
Ys = (1 − θ)
( psPn
)1−σ
φYn +
(
ps
Ps
)1−σ
Ys
 . (2.16)
Using demand functions (2.5), (2.6), the price indices and optimal firm prices along with equa-
tions (2.12), (2.13) and (2.15), (2.16), the equilibrium equations are obtained as
wσn =
(
θ

) [
wn
θw1−σn + (1 − θ)ξφw1−σs
+
(1 − )φws
θφw1−σn + (1 − θ)ξw1−σs
]
, (2.17)
and
wσs =
(
(1 − θ)ξ
(1 − )
) [
φwn
θw1−σn + (1 − θ)ξφw1−σs
+
(1 − )ws
θφw1−σn + (1 − θ)ξw1−σs
]
. (2.18)
The equilibrium equations depend on the productivity parameters, the allocation of skilled and
unskilled households, the freeness of trade between North and South, and the elasticity of substi-
tution between varieties.
2.2.5 Welfare Analysis
In this section, I conduct a welfare analysis in order to study how a productivity improvement
in South affects (i) the welfare in North, and (ii) the welfare in South. For each region, equations
(2.12) and (2.13) show that a productivity change in South has no impact on the income distribution
between skilled and unskilled households. Thus, a region’s income distribution is fixed as long
as the number of unskilled households remains constant. As a result, a welfare analysis can be
conducted by looking at the aggregate real income in each region. Given Warlas’ law, the markets
clear when the total production in one region is equal to the total demand for varieties that are
produced in this region. Without loss of generality, I fix the unskilled wage in North to one. Thus,
I obtain the general equilibrium equation for the entire economy as
1 =
(
θ

) [

θ + (1 − θ)ξφw1−σs
+
(1 − )φws
θφ + (1 − θ)ξw1−σs
]
. (2.19)
The idea is to express the unskilled wage rate in South (i.e. ws) in terms of the welfare in North
(i.e. Vn). In order to do this, I use the North’s indirect utility (2.7) along with equation (2.12),
which gives the total income expressed in units of the unskilled wage rate in North. Therefore, the
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total welfare in North can be written as
Vn =
Yn
Pn
=
wn(
θw1−σn + (1 − θ)ξφw1−σs
) 1
1−σ
. (2.20)
Since wn = 1, equation (2.20) can be rewritten as(

Vn
)1−σ
= θ + (1 − θ)ξφw1−σs . (2.21)
Let un = (1 − θ)ξφw1−σs be a monotone transformation of the welfare in North (i.e. Vn). Then,
it can be immediately shown that dwsdun < 0 and
dws
dξ > 0. Using (2.21) and the definition of un,
the equilibrium equation (2.19) can be rewritten as a function of the welfare in North and the
productivity parameters. Hence,
1 = F(ξ, un) =
(
θ

)  θ + un + (1 − )ws(ξ, un)θφ + unφ
 . (2.22)
In order to study the impact of a productivity change in South on the welfare in North, I consider
the total differential of equation (2.22) as
0 = Fξdξ + Fundun, (2.23)
where Fξ and Fun are the derivatives of F(.) with respect to ξ and un, respectively. The goal is to
determine the sign of
dun
dξ
= − Fξ
Fun
. (2.24)
After conducting a comparative static analysis, the next proposition summarizes how a productiv-
ity improvement in South affects the welfare in North.
Proposition 2.1: A skilled or unskilled labor productivity improvement in South has a positive
impact on the welfare in North.
Proof. From equation (2.22) with dwsdun < 0 and
dws
dξ > 0, it can be seen that Fun < 0 and Fξ > 0.
Thus, dundξ > 0. 
On the one hand, a productivity improvement of unskilled labor in South reduces the marginal
cost of production. Thus, it reduces the consumer price of varieties that are produced in South.
Therefore, the price indices in both regions go down. This has a positive impact on the welfare
of both regions as long as the wage in South does not respond. On the other hand, taking into
account the wage response in South, an increase in ξ has a positive impact on the unskilled wage
rate in South. As a result, the price indices in both regions increase. This has a negative impact
on the welfare in North, all else equal. The total income in South increases since the unskilled
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wage rate in South goes up. Thus, households located in South become richer. This has a positive
impact on the demand for varieties that are produced in North. Also, given the fixed unskilled
wage rate in North, the total income in North is constant. Proposition 2.1 shows that after taking
into account all possible effects, the welfare in North increases when the productivity of unskilled
labor in South improves.
Moreover, a productivity improvement of skilled labor in South has the same impact on the
welfare in North as the one of unskilled labor. The adjustment mechanism, however, differs. A
productivity change of skilled labor in South does not affect the consumer price of varieties that
are produced in South. From equation (2.10) it can be seen that an improvement in the productivity
of skilled labor in South increases the number of varieties that are produced in South. As a result,
the price indices in both regions go down. With falling price indices and fixed total income, the
welfare of both skilled and unskilled households in North increases.
In the following part, I extend the welfare analysis in order to study the impact of productivity
changes in South on its welfare. I use Warlas’ law and fix the unskilled wage in South to one.
Therefore, the equilibrium equation for the entire economy is given by
1 =
(
(1 − θ)ξ
(1 − )
) [
φwn
θw1−σn + (1 − θ)ξφ
+
(1 − )
θφw1−σn + (1 − θ)ξ
]
. (2.25)
The equilibrium equation depends on the productivity parameters, the market sizes, the freeness
of trade between North and South, and the elasticity of substitution between varieties. As in the
case of North, I apply the same idea in order to express the unskilled wage rate in North (i.e. ws)
in terms of the welfare in South (i.e. Vs). Then,
Vs =
Ys
Ps
=
(1 − )(
θφw1−σn + (1 − θ)ξ
) 1
1−σ
⇔
⇔ us − (1 − θ)ξ
φθ
= w1−σn ,
(2.26)
with us =
(
Vs
1−
)σ−1
. Thus, it immediately follows that dw
1−σ
n
dus
> 0 and dw
1−σ
n
dξ = − (1−θ)φθ < 0. Equation
(2.26) is derived by using the expression of the total income (2.13), along with the price index
in South and normalizing the unskilled wage rate in South to one. Replacing equation (2.26)
back in equation (2.25), the equilibrium equation can be written as a function of the productivity
parameters and the welfare in South. Thus,
1 = G(wn(us, ξ), ξ). (2.27)
In order to study the impact of a productivity change in South on its welfare, I consider the total
differential of the expression (2.27) as
0 = Gξdξ +Gusdus, (2.28)
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with Gξ and Gus being the derivatives of G(.) with respect to ξ and us, respectively. The goal is to
determine the sign of dusdξ = −
Gξ
Gus
. The next proposition summarizes how a productivity improve-
ment in South affects the welfare in South.
Proposition 2.2: A skilled or unskilled labor productivity improvement in South has a positive
impact on the welfare in South.
Proof. From equation (2.27) it can be seen that dGdwn > 0. With
dw1−σn
dus
> 0 and dw
1−σ
n
dξ < 0, it can be
seen that Gus < 0 and Gξ > 0. Thus,
dus
dξ > 0. 
The model predicts that a productivity improvement in South is beneficial for the region itself
since its total welfare goes up. Due to the fact that the income distribution is fixed, the gains from
a productivity improvement in South accrue to all consumers in this region. Therefore, the welfare
of both skilled and unskilled households increases.
2.3 Two-Sector, Two-Factor Model
2.3.1 Set up
I obtain the previous results under the assumption of a Dixit-Stiglitz manufacturing industry. Un-
der this assumption, any change in productivity between regions does not have any impact on
income distribution within each region. In reality, however, benefits or losses that come from a re-
gion’s productivity improvement are often distributed unevenly between the factors of production.
As a result, any change in productivity between regions creates losers as well as winners within
each region.
In this section, based on Krugman (1980), I consider a two-region, two-sector, two-factor mo-
nopolistic competition model, in order to study the impact of a relative productivity improvement
on overall social welfare. Moreover, I use this set up for conducting a group-wise welfare anal-
ysis, studying how a productivity improvement in South affects the welfare of each production
factor, in each region. More specifically, I assume that an agricultural sector and a manufactur-
ing Dixit-Stiglitz sector exist in the economy. Also, there are two types of household supplying
unskilled and skilled labor, respectively. Skilled labor is a specific factor since it is employed in
the manufacturing industry. Unskilled labor is a non-specific factor, being freely mobile between
sectors.
In order to keep the model analytically tractable, I use two simplifying assumptions. First, I
assume that the identical consumer preferences are characterized by a quasi-linear utility function.
Second, I keep the agricultural sector as simple as possible, assuming that it produces a costless
tradable homogeneous good using only unskilled labor under perfect competition and constant
returns to scale. This ensures that the wage of unskilled labor is equalized between sectors and also
across regions. Intuitively, under flexible wages a productivity improvement in South increases the
wage of unskilled labor in South and this reduces the price indices less than under uniform wages.
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As a result, the positive impact on welfare of both regions that comes from the reduction of the
price indices is smaller under the assumption of flexible wages than that of uniform wages.
Finally, since both skilled and unskilled productivity parameters α and δ can be merged into
one parameter, I assume that the productivity of skilled labor is the same across regions. Only the
productivity of unskilled labor differs with the one in North being higher than that in South.
2.3.2 Demand Side
Household preferences are characterized by a quasi-linear utility function with CES sub-utility
over manufacturing varieties. Let the utility of a typical household located in region i be
Ui = µ lnCiX +C
i
A, i = n, s, (2.29)
where 0 < µ < 1 and µ < r = min{Rn,Rs}. The parameter µ expresses the expenditure on
manufacturing products. CiX is the consumption of the manufacturing aggregate and C
i
A denotes
the consumption of the agricultural good. The budget constraint of a representative household is
given by
PiCiX +C
i
A = yi, i = n, s. (2.30)
yi denotes the household’s income. Each household maximizes its utility subject to its budget
constraint. One obtains the demand functions for the manufacturing aggregate and the agricultural
good as
CiX =
µ
Pi
, CiA = yi − µ, i = n, s. (2.31)
Moreover, the demand functions of a representative household located in North for manufacturing
varieties are obtained as
xnn = µp−σn Pσ−1n , xns = µ(τps)−σPσ−1n . (2.32)
Similarly, the demand functions of a representative household located in South are
xsn = µ(τpn)−σPσ−1s , xss = µp−σs Pσ−1s . (2.33)
Finally, the indirect utility is given by
Ωi = yi − µ ln Pi, i = n, s. (2.34)
2.3.3 Supply Side and Market Equilibrium
The agricultural good serves as the numeraire. It is produced in a perfectly competitive environ-
ment under constant returns with a unit input requirement of unskilled labor. Perfect competition
enforces marginal cost pricing. Costless trade equalizes prices between North and South. This
indirectly makes the wage rates of unskilled labor equal to one in both regions.
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Turning to the industrial sector, I assume that the productivity of skilled labor is the same across
regions and equal to one. In addition, the productivity of unskilled labor in North is higher than
that in South. Thus, the relative productivity of North compare to South is denoted by 1/δ > 1.
The profits of a representative North-based firm are given by
pin = (pn − 1)Xn − Rn. (2.35)
Similarly, the profits of a representative South-based firm are given by
pis = (ps − 1
δ
)Xs − Rs. (2.36)
A typical firm acts as if it is a monopolist facing a demand curve with constant elasticity equal to
σ. Following the standard approach, the profit-maximizing consumer price is
pn =
σ
σ − 1 = p¯, ps =
σ
σ − 1δ
−1 = p¯δ−1. (2.37)
In order to simplify the notation, I define λ = δσ−1 ≤ 1. As a result, the CES-price indices for the
manufacturing varieties in both regions can be derived as
Pn = p¯ (θ + (1 − θ)φλ) 11−σ , Ps = p¯ (θφ + (1 − θ)λ) 11−σ . (2.38)
The zero profit condition requires that the wage rate of skilled labor must be equal to the operating
profit. Thus,
Xn = (σ − 1)Rn, Xs = δ(σ − 1)Rs (2.39)
Imposing the condition of zero profits along with the aggregate demand functions (2.32), (2.33)
and the price indices and optimal firm prices, the equilibrium skilled wages in every region (i.e.
Rn and Rs) are obtained as
Rn =
µ
σ
[
( + θ)
θ + (1 − θ)φλ +
φ((1 − ) + (1 − θ))
θφ + (1 − θ)λ
]
=
µ
σ
[
Mn
Qn
+
φMs
Qs
]
,
(2.40)
and
Rs =
µλ
σ
[
φ( + θ)
θ + (1 − θ)φλ +
((1 − ) + (1 − θ))
θφ + (1 − θ)λ
]
=
µλ
σ
[
φMn
Qn
+
Ms
Qs
]
,
(2.41)
with market sizes
Mn =  + θ, Ms = (1 − ) + (1 − θ), (2.42)
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and potentials
Qn = θ + (1 − θ)φλ, Qs = θφ + (1 − θ)λ. (2.43)
A productivity improvement in South (i.e. λ goes up) increases the market potentials Qn and Qs,
respectively. The price indices fall in both regions. Thus, the skilled nominal wage rate in North
Rn, goes down. In South, an increase in λ has two opposite effects on the skilled nominal wage
rate Rs. On the one hand, an increase in the market potentials leads to a decrease of the skilled
nominal wage rate in South. On the other hand, South-based firms become more efficient. Thus,
they can pay higher wage rate to skilled labor. The first impact can be seen by keeping the numer-
ator of (2.41) fixed. An improvement in λ increases both, Qn and Qs; this implies that Rs goes
down. To see the second impact, the market potentials in (2.41) are kept fixed. A productivity im-
provement in South increases its skilled nominal wage rate. The next proposition summarizes the
impact of a productivity change in South on the skilled nominal wage rates Rn and Rs, respectively.
Proposition 2.3: The skilled nominal wage rate in North Rn decreases in λ; the skilled nominal
wage rate in South Rs, however, increases in λ.
Proof.
dRn
dλ
= −µ(1 − θ)φ
σ
(
Mn
Q2n
+
Ms
Q2s
)
< 0 (2.44)
and
dRs
dλ
=
µ
σ
(
φMn
Qn
+
Ms
Qs
)
− µλ
σ
(
φ2Mn(1 − θ)
Q2n
+
Ms(1 − θ)
Q2s
)
=
=
µθφ
σ
(
Mn
Q2n
+
Ms
Q2s
)
> 0.
(2.45)

Proposition 2.3 shows that a productivity improvement in South increases its skilled nominal
wage rate; it, however, reduces the skilled nominal wage rate in North. Figure 2.1 illustrates
both Rn and Rs for different values of the freeness of trade φ. Starting from the benchmark case,
the middle two lines show how the skilled nominal wage rates change with respect to φ, when
the productivity is equal across regions. The yellow line depicts the skilled nominal wage rate in
North; the green line depicts the skilled nominal wage rate in South. We observe that both nominal
wage rates are not monotone. They are equalized in the case of autarky (i.e. φ = 0) and in the case
of completely free trade (i.e. φ = 1).
Moreover, the upper line (i.e. blue) and the lower line (i.e. red) show how the skilled nominal
wage rates change with respect to φ, when the productivity differs across regions. Both Rn and Rs
are still not monotone. They are equalized in the case of autarky (i.e. φ = 0), but not in the case of
completely free trade (i.e. φ = 1).
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Figure 2.1: Rn, Rs and Freeness of Trade φ
2.3.4 Welfare Analysis
In order to study the impact of a change in relative productivity on the overall social welfare, I
consider a Utilitarian concept. Under quasi-linearity, the marginal utility of income for all agents
is equal to one. Thus, income redistributions do not affect the aggregate welfare. Therefore, the
Kaldor and Hicks compensation criteria are all the same. Both criteria allow for potential Pareto
improvements since people that are made better off can in principle compensate those that are made
worse off using the appropriate transfers, without affecting the aggregate welfare. This allows us
to use an aggregate utility criterion, considering the un-weighted sum of individual utilities.
A productivity improvement in South increases the market potentials Qn and Qs, respectively.
As a result, the price indices go down in both regions. Since the unskilled wage rates are constant,
it can be easily seen that the total income in the entire economy is constant, too. With constant
elasticity of substitution between varieties, the income of skilled labor is a proportion of the total
revenue which is equal to the total expenditure on the manufacturing products. Under quasi-
linearity, the total expenditure on the manufacturing products is equal to 2µ. Thus, the entire
income of skilled labor is equal to 2µ/σ. Also, the entire income of unskilled labor is equal to
1. Hence, the total income in the economy is equal to 2µ/σ + 1. With constant labor income
and falling price indices, the entire Utilitarian welfare increases. Therefore, under the scope of
quasi-linearity, a productivity improvement in South is always beneficial for the entire economy.
In addition, I conduct a group-wise welfare analysis, in order to study how a productivity im-
provement in South affects the welfare of each group of households, in each region. Since indi-
viduals are group-wisely identical, it is enough to study the impact of λ on the indirect utility of a
single individual. In the case of an unskilled worker, a reduction in the price indices increases his
welfare since his income is constant. Thus, a productivity improvement in South is beneficial for
all unskilled workers in the economy. Moreover, according to proposition 2.3, an increase in λ has
a positive impact on the skilled nominal wage rate in South. Therefore, with falling price indices
and increasing income, the welfare of skilled workers located in South increases, too. Hence,
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the only interesting question is how the welfare of skilled workers located in North responds to
productivity changes in South.
Thus, I consider the derivative of Ωn with respect to λ using (2.34), (2.38) and (2.44), this, up
to positive constants, leads to
Ω′n = −ω
(
 + θ
Q2n
+
(1 − ) + (1 − θ)
Q2s
)
+
1
Qn
, (2.46)
with ω = σ−1σ .
ω is monotonously increasing in σ, and ω ∈ (0, 1). Let us call Ω′n the Welfare Effect (WE), the left
term the Income Effect (IE) and the right term the Price Effect (PE). Proposition 2.3 shows that
IE is negative and PE is positive. Thus, WE is negative if and only if IE dominates. Moreover, if
ω is close enough to zero implying σ being close enough to one, PE dominates and thus WE is
positive. Intuitively, when individuals in North have high preferences for diversity, a productivity
improvement in South increases the welfare of individuals located in North since PE dominates
IE. The effect of λ can go both ways and the challenge is to separate the parameter space into
subspaces where WE is positive or negative, respectively.
I consider the case where both regions are symmetric in terms of the population size, i.e.,  = 12
and θ = 12 . Then,
Ω′
n|θ== 12
= −ω
(
1
Q2n
+
1
Q2s
)
+
1
Qn
. (2.47)
More conveniently, I study the sign of W′(λ, φ, ω) = QnQsΩ′n, which is the same as the sign of Ω′n.
Let z(λ, φ) = QnQs , then
W′(λ, φ, ω) = −ω
(
1
z(λ, φ)
+ z(λ, φ)
)
+ Qs, (2.48)
with z(0, φ) = 1φ , z(1, φ) = z(λ, 1) = 1, z(λ, 0) =
1
λ , zλ < 0 and zφ < 0 being the derivatives of
z(λ, φ) with respect to λ and φ, respectively.
D = {(λ, φ, ω) | W′(λ, φ, ω) = 0} defines a manifold in R3 separating domains with positive from
those with negative WE. In order to characterize D, I need the derivatives W′ω, W′λ and W
′
φ of W
′
with respect to ω, λ and φ, respectively. Thus,
W′ω = −
(
1
z(λ, φ)
+ z(λ, φ)
)
< 0, (2.49)
and
W′λ = −ωzλ
(
1 − 1
z2(λ, φ)
)
+
1
2
> 0, (2.50)
and
W′φ = −ωzφ
(
1 − 1
z2(λ, φ)
)
+
1
2
> 0. (2.51)
Since λ ≤ 1 it is implied that z(λ, φ) ≥ 1 and thus the parenthesis
(
1 − 1z2(λ,φ)
)
is non-negative. From
(2.49), (2.50) and (2.51) it is shown that D is monotone with respect to the parameters of interest.
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Therefore, D is an increasing curve in the parameter space R3 with λ and φ on the horizontal
axes and ω on the vertical axis. Inserting into W′(λ, φ, ω) it is immediate that W′(0, φ, ω) =
W′(1, φ, ω) = W′(λ, 0, ω˜) = W′(λ, 1, ω˜) = 0 with
0 < ω =
φ2
2(1 + φ2)
< ω < ω =
φ + 1
4
< 1, (2.52)
and
0 < ω˜ =
λ2
2(1 + λ2)
< ω < ω˜ =
λ + 1
4
< 1. (2.53)
D defines implicitly a function ω(λ, φ) such that WE is negative above and positive below. Then,
(2.52) and (2.53) give us the margin curves ω(0, φ), ω(1, φ), ω(λ, 0) and ω(λ, 1) of D. Since ω, φ
and λ are all between 0 and 1, they can be placed in the axes of a cube with side length 1, with ω
on the vertical axis (ordinate), λ on the horizontal axis (abscissa), and φ on the applicate. Then,
(2.52) and (2.53) fully characterize the end points of a monotone continuous manifold within the
cube, with its corner points being ω(0, 0) = 0, ω(0, 1) = ω(1, 0) = 1/4 and ω(1, 1) = 1/2. The
next figure shows the manifold that separates the parameter space into two subspaces where WE
is negative on the domain above and positive on the domain below the manifold.
Figure 2.2: Manifold
Intuitively, North region, which is relatively more efficient in the manufacturing sector, is a net
exporter of manufacturing varieties and a net importer of agricultural goods. South region, which
is relatively less productive in the manufacturing sector, is a net exporter of agricultural goods and
a net importer of manufacturing products. The inter-industry pattern of trade is determined by the
cross-region difference in relative labor productivity, just as in a Ricardian model. Therefore, a
productivity improvement in South is an import-biased growth from the point of view of South. An
import-biased growth tends to improve a growing region’s terms of trade and to harm its trading
partner.
Due to the fall of price indices in both regions, the impact of a productivity change in South
on the welfare of skilled workers located in North is ambiguous. It depends on the elasticity of
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substitution between varieties, the freeness of trade between North and South, and the productivity
in South. When ω is small then σ is small; this implies that individuals have high preferences for
diversity. A productivity improvement in South decreases (i) the skilled nominal wage rate in
North and (ii) the price indices in both regions. For small values of ω, PE dominates IE since
consumers located in North are willing to buy more and cheaper varieties from South. Thus, the
welfare of skilled workers located in North goes up. Additionally, keeping ω constant, larger
freeness of trade increases the market potentials and thus the price indices fall. This has a positive
impact on the welfare of skilled workers located in North, too.
Moreover, for given values of ω and φ, a larger λ reduces the skilled nominal wage rate in
North but, at the same time, it makes the varieties that are produced in South cheaper. The higher
λ the cheaper the varieties that are produced in South, and the lower the price indices in both
regions. The impact of given changes of λ depends on whether λ is large or small. As long as
ω and φ are constant, productivity improvements in South have negative effects on the welfare of
skilled workers in North for small values of λ. However, for larger values of λ there are cases
where PE dominates IE. Thus, the welfare of skilled workers located in North increases when the
productivity improves in South.
Finally, it is interesting to study empirically which side of the cube is the most likely one.
Based on the work of Head and Mayer (2004), the estimations of σ vary between 3 and 5 when
the industrial sector stands for all tradable goods in the economy. By contrast, when this sector is
a specific industry, σ sharply rises because varieties are now much better substitutes than in the
aggregate level; a value of σ close to 7 is then acceptable. Therefore, ω varies between 2/3 and
4/5 when σ is between 3 and 5, respectively; ω is 6/7 when σ is equal to 7. The minimum value of
ω (i.e. ω = 2/3) is larger than the maximum corner point (i.e. ω(1, 1) = 1/2) of the manifold. As a
result, no matter what the rest parameter values are (i.e. φ and λ), empirically the sub-space above
the manifold is the most likely one. This implies that IE dominates PE. Therefore, a productivity
improvement in South is harmful for skilled households located in North since it reduces their
welfare.
2.3.5 Robustness
I use the quasi-linearity assumption for computational reasons. In fact, this choice does not take
into account the income effect, although it makes the calculations simpler and the model analyt-
ically tractable. In this section, I relax this assumption, studying the importance of the income
effect by considering a Cobb-Douglas utility function. More specifically, I numerically study the
impact of a productivity improvement in South on the welfare of both North-based and South-
based skilled workers, considering different values for the basic parameters of the model, i.e.,
µ, σ, φ, λ.
The selection of the parameter values is based on the work of Head and Mayer (2004). I use
the same values for σ as in Section 2.3.4; µ takes values between 0.5 and 0.8, when the industrial
sector stands for all tradable goods in the economy. When the manufacturing sector is a specific
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industry, µ typically takes a value lower than 0.2, which approximately corresponds to the share
of the manufactured good in a developed economy. Finally, both λ and φ take values between 0
and 1.
For given values of µ, σ and φ, I plot the indirect utility of both North-based and South-based
skilled workers over a range of values of λ ∈ [0, 1]. The results are obtained for a particular
parameter profile, i.e., σ ∈ {4, 7}, µ ∈ {0.2, 0.6}, and φ ∈ {1/3, 1/2, 2/3}. After considering all 12
possible parameter combinations, I find that the results in Section 2.3.4 regarding the impact of
productivity improvements in South on the welfare of skilled workers are robust; a productivity
improvement in South decreases the welfare of skilled workers located in North while it increases
the welfare of skilled workers located in South. For example, the next figure shows how the
welfare of a North-based and a South-based skilled worker changes with respect to λ for σ = 4,
µ = 0.6 and φ = 1/3.
Figure 2.3: Welfare of a Skilled Worker
2.4 Conclusion
I apply a general equilibrium model that takes into account how factor prices respond to changes
in relative productivity. It consists of two regions, a manufacturing Dixit-Stiglitz sector and two
production factors. I show that a region’s productivity improvement is beneficial for the region
itself as well as for its trading partner. Moreover, I study how benefits or loses that come from for-
eign productivity changes are distributed between domestic production factors. To do this, I use
a two-region, two-sector, two-factor monopolistic competition model, relaxing the single-factor
assumption which is used in other works. I show that a developing region’s productivity im-
provement is beneficial for the entire economy. I also find that a developing region’s productivity
improvement benefits all unskilled workers in the economy and skilled workers in the developing
region; it, however, hurts skilled workers in the developed region. The results of the second model
are derived under the quasi-linearity assumption, which means that the income effect has been
eliminated. In order to study the robustness of the model, I relax this assumption (Section 2.3.5)
by considering a Cobb-Douglas utility function. My findings exhibit that the model is fully robust
for a specific parameter profile.
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